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Abstract 
Software systems play an important role in social infrastructures, and in the public and private sectors, for example in core 
banking, enterprise resource planning systems, electronic medical record systems, telephone exchange systems, etc. In 
such fundamental systems, we desire not only correctness but also robustness. Formal methods, such as software 
verification, have focused on correctness rather than robustness.  The Spice calculus, which was proposed by Nishizaki et 
al., is a calculus process which enables us to formalize and analyze the resistance of communication protocols against 
Denial-of-Service attacks. The key idea of the analysis is analyzing costs of initiators and responders in communication 
protocols. In this paper, we extend the target area of systems to be analyzed by the Spice calculus and describe a new 
analysis methodology for distributed systems. We demonstrate analysis of a telephone exchange system, as an example of 
our methodology. In this paper, we extend the target area of systems to be analyzed by the Spice calculus and show a new 
analysis methodology for distributed systems. We demonstrate analysis of a telephone exchange system, as an example of 
our methodology. We set up ISUP of Signaling System No. 7 as a target and formalized a simple telephone network based 
on it in the framework of the Spice calculus. We then analyzed its connection establishing process and computation cost 
consumed the connection establishment. 
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1. Introduction 
Software systems play an important role in social infrastructures, and in the public and private sectors, for 
example in core banking, enterprise resource planning systems, electronic medical record systems, telephone 
exchange systems, etc. In such fundamental systems, we desire not only correctness with respect to 
specification requirements but also robustness to cope with unintended situations. Formal methods, such as 
software verification, have focused on correctness rather than robustness. 
Many failures have occurred in such IT systems. For example, the core banking system of Mizuho 
Financial Group, which is the largest banking company in Japan, failed on March 14th 2011 and did not 
recover until the 23rd, owing to an overload caused by numerous payments of contributions for the Tohoku 
Earthquake[7]. Such lengthy failures of computer systems can be mitigated by improvements in system 
robustness. 
Formal methods, such as software verification, have focused on correctness rather than robustness.  Spice 
calculus [9], which was proposed by Nishizaki et al., is a calculus process which enables us to formalize and 
analyze the resistance of communication protocols against Denial-of-Service attacks, based on Milner's pi-
calculus [6]. The key idea of the analysis is analyzing costs of initiators and responders in communication 
protocols. Vulnerability to Denial-of-Service attacks is caused by lack of balance between an initiator and a 
responder. Cost analysis is important not only for resistance against Denial-of-Service attacks but also for 
improving a system's robustness to withstanding various unintended situations. In this paper, we therefore 
apply Spice calculus to analysis of robustness of distributed systems. We conduct a case study using a 
telephone exchange system, as an example. 
2. Spice calculus 
We introduce Spice calculus [9] in this section.  In the calculus, there are two categories of expression: one 
is a set of terms and the other is a set of processes.  A term denotes data and a process denotes a series of 
computational operations which can be executed concurrently. Terms of spice-calculus are defined 
inductively as follows: 
Processes of Spice calculus are defined inductively as follows: 
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Message sending (out M ۃ ۄǢ  ሻ sends message N through the port M. Message receiving (inp M (x); P) 
receives the message through port M and binds it to the variable x. Parallel decomposition (P | Q) executes the 
processes P and Q in parallel. The stopping process stop means an intermediate status on the way to the 
termination process end. In our computational system, memory allocation and de-allocation are explicitly 
operated as process (store x = M; P ) and (free x; P), respectively. Matching (match M is N err {P}; Q) is a 
conditional branch: if the values of M and N are equivalent, then P is executed; otherwise, Q is executed. 
Selection (P+Q) is a non-deterministic choice; either P or Q is executed non-deterministically. 
The type system of Spice calculus is one of its distinctive features, and it enables us to specify the 
computational cost entailed by each computer node. For example, process (P1 | (Q | P2))  is of type A ф (B ф A),
that is,  
which describes that the processes P1 and P2 are executed on the computer nodes A and Q on B. Types of 
Spice calculus are defined as follows: 
Operational semantics are given to the Spice calculus as transition relation between processes; a 
computational cost is attached to each step of the transition. For example, 
This transition means that 
xThe processes P and Q are executed in parallel on nodes a and b respectively; 
xThe process (P ф Q ) makes a transition to (P’ ф Q’ ); 
x In this transition, matching and storing operations are done with two match-costs and one store-cost, 
respectively.
The transition relation is defined inductively by several rules (c.f. [9]). The following is one of the 
reduction rules defining the inner-process computation: 
If it is assumed that the costs for evaluating M and N are c and d respectively, and both the resulting values 
of M and N are V, then the expression is transited to Q and the computational cost of the transition is 
(c+d+match).
The rule below is one of the reduction rules defining the inter-process computation: 
This rule means that if the process expression (inp n (x); P) is executed on computer node a, then memory 
cost store for a variable x on a. It is transited to an expression (x)P, which denotes an intermediate form 
waiting for the arrival of a message. 
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3. Formalization of a signaling system using spice calculus  
3.1. Signaling System No. 7 and ISUP 
In this section, we formalize a switched telephone network based on a telephony signaling protocol, 
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7)[3], using Spice calculus [9]. We focus on an example on a simple switched 
telephone network which consists of two switches and several telephones. Its network topology is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
In SS7, ISDN User Part (ISUP) defines the messages and protocol used in the establishment and tear down 
of calls over the public switched network, and to manage the trunk network on which they relay. ISUP is 
depicted as a sequence diagram in Fig. 2. Terminal nodes PhoneA and PhoneB are connecting, and 
intermediate switches SwitchA and SwitchB relay the connection. Control messages –iam, acm, anm, rel, and 
rlc –are defined in ISUP. The messages used are as follows. 
x IAM (Initial address message), which is the first message sent to inform the partner switch that a 
call has to be established. 
xACM (Address complete message), which is returned from the terminating switch when the subscriber is 
reached. 
xANM (Answer message), which is sent when the subscriber picks up the phone. 
xREL (Release), which is sent to clear the call when a subscriber goes on hook. 
xRLC (Release completed), which is acknowledgement of the release. 
The state transition diagram of Fig. 3 describes the behavior of a phone. The model of the phone receives 
messages: dialtone, ringtone, notone, busytone, and check. The former four messages represent notification of 
status from the partner switch, and the latter message gives confirmation of connectability. The model sends 
messages off hook, onhook, and dial. The former two messages describe signals that the handset is off-
hooking and on-hooking, respectively. The latter message represents a dialing signal. 
Fig. 2. Inter-city Call 
Fig. 1. Example of Switched Telephone Network 
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3.2. Formalization of Phones and Switches in Spice Calculus 
In Spice calculus, the behavior of phones (i.e. subscribers) and switches is formalized as processes. The 
behavior  of a phone a with its partner switch A which has a connection with phone b with its partner switch B, 
is described as Subscriber(a,A,B,b), which is divided in two sub-processes, Sender(a,A,B,b) and 
Receiver(a,A): 
Fig. 3. Transition diagram of phone
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The ports which are used in the processes for communication are depicted in Figs. 4 and 5. 
Here introduce the paper, and add nomenclature if necessary, in a box with the same font size as the rest of 
the paper. The paragraphs continue from here and are only separated by headings, subheadings, images and 
formulae. The section headings are arranged by numbers, and are in bold and 10 pt. Here follows further 
instructions for authors. 
3.3. Cost Estimation by Spice Calculus 
In this section, we show a cost analysis of a case in which a subscriber a with a partner switch A requests a 
connection to a subscriber b with a partner switch B. This is simpler than the situation mentioned in Figs. 4 
and 5. Subscribers a1, a2 and a3 are simplified into only one subscriber a; b1, b2, and b3 are simplified into b. 
The behavior of this case is described as the following process. 
Fig. 4. Intermediate Ports (before establishing connection)
Fig. 5. Intermediate Ports (after establishing connection)
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By reducing the process described the system; we can see not only the computational result but also the 
total cost. 
167 Yasuaki Ibayashi and Shin-ya Nishizaki /  IERI Procedia  10 ( 2014 )  160 – 168 
Summing up the costs attached to each transition step, we can see the total computation cost is as follows: 
4. Related Works 
Protocol verification has been studied for the last decade using several kinds of framework. For example, 
Bruns et al. [1] studied the MSMIE protocol, which allows processors in a distributed system to communicate 
via shared memory. They provided a formal model of the MSMIE protocol in Milner's CCS and analyzed the 
formal model using an automated verification tool, the Concurrency Workbench.  
Quantitative analysis of communication and secure protocols was studied by one of the authors [9], but 
also by Cervesato [2], which enables evaluation of protocol resilience to various forms of denial of service, 
guessing attacks, and resource limitation using the MSR (Multi-Set Rewriting) specification language. 
Liu et al. [5] formalized and verified in the framework of a colored petri net the capability exchange 
signaling (CES) protocol, which is a sub-protocol of the H.245 control protocol for multimedia 
communication. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a case study in which we formalize the connection establishment part of a 
communication protocol in practical use, Signaling System No. 7 using the Spice calculus proposed in the 
previous work [9]. We analyze this from the quantitative viewpoint of the computational cost. From this case 
study, we can see that the Spice calculus has enough expressive power to describe protocols for practically-
used systems.  
Analysis of communication protocols using the spice calculus is too complicated to handle without 
automated software support. In our previous work [4], we proposed a method for symbolic analysis of a 
distributed system by means of numerical simulation. This is a promising research direction. Moreover, it is 
also necessary to extend the Spice calculus to improve its expressive power; for example, unification of 
environment calculus [8] into the spice calculus will give us more flexibility in network topology. 
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